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AMNESTY 
 
Amnesty may be defined, in simple terms, as a sovereign act of forgiveness for past 
offences, most often granted to a group of persons as a whole. This definition excludes 
acts of forgiveness for offenders who have already been convicted, which are termed as 
pardon. 
There is no pre-definite scheme for amnesties. They are most commonly granted 
through a national law or a governmental decree, but they may also be included in peace 
agreements between States or amongst internal factions at the end of a civil war.  
Amnesties have been granted for centuries, often at the end of an armed conflict. Just to 
give a very ancient example, according to Art. II of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648): 
“there shall be on one side and on the other a perpetual oblivion, amnesty, or pardon of 
all that has been committed since the beginning of these troubles…” .  
Only recently though, international humanitarian law made an explicit reference to 
amnesty. Art. 6(5) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
provides: “At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the 
broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or 
those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are 
interned or detained.”  
No other international law instrument exhort States to grant amnesties, and, generally 
speaking, international law must be regarded as neutral towards their use. 
However, there is a crucial question: are international bodies, such as courts an 
tribunals, bound by amnesties? Surely, there is a trend towards considering amnesties 
incompatible with international crimes, which emerges from a number of relevant 
decisions by international criminal tribunals, human rights courts and domestic courts.  
Amongst the first bodies to pronounce on the incompatibility between amnesty and 
international crimes (more specifically on the crime of torture) was the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee which stated the following: “The Committee has noted that 
some States have granted amnesty in respect of acts of torture. Amnesties are generally 
incompatible with the duty of States to investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom from 
such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not occur in the future.” 
(General Comment No. 20 on Art. 7 of the ICCPR,  1994).  
In its landmark judgement delivered in Prosecutor v. Furundzja (TC, Judgment No. IT-
95-17/1-T), 10 December 1998, § 155), the ICTY held that the fact that torture is 
prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law has the effect to internationally 
de-legitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial act authorising torture. 
Therefore, a State cannot take national measures authorising or condoning torture or 
absolving its perpetrators through an amnesty law. If this were the case, other States are 
bound not to recognize such an act. 
The concern not to allow amnesty for serious international crimes was evident during 
the negotiation between the United Nations and Sierra Leone for the establishment of 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Art. 10 of the Statute of the Special Court (2000), 
reads: “An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special 
Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute [crimes 
against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law] shall not be a 
bar to prosecution”. 
 In a decision delivered in 2004 (Prosecutor v. Kallon, Norman and Kamara, AC, 
Decision, 13 March 2004, SCSL-2004-15-16-17 AR 72), the Special Court ruled that 
amnesties granted to persons belonging to the warring factions in the civil war by the 
Lomé Peace Agreement (concluded in 1999) are no bar to prosecution before it. This 
decision was affirmed in Prosecutor v. Kondewa (AC, Decision, 25 May 2004, SCSL-
2004-14 AR 72). As noted by Professor Cassese, the Special Court reached the right 
decision, although in a rather convoluted manner.  
One should also mention the agreement between the UN and Cambodia on the 
establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers for Cambodia, which provides that there 
should be no amnesty for the crimes committed in Cambodia by the Khmer rouges 
between 1975 and 1979 (Article 11). 
On the contrary, there are uncertainties as to what extent an amnesty may bar criminal 
prosecutions in front of the ICC, since the issue was not resolved during the 
negotiations of the Rome Statute. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the decision of the Supreme Court of Chile in Sandoval 
(Supreme Court, causa 517/2004, Resolución n. 22267, available in Spanish at 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/doc/krassnoff.html) affirming that amnesty can be 
no bar to the prosecution of enforced disappearances and the decision of  the Supreme 
Court of Argentina, in Simón, Julio Hector y otros  (Supreme Court, causa 17.768, 14 
June 2005, available in Spanish at www.derechos.org/nizkor/arg/doc/nulidad.html)   
that declared unconstitutional and void two amnesty laws adopted in the 1980s to 
protect the authors of serious crimes such as enforced disappearances.  Both rulings 
both followed the conclusions reached in Barrios Altos by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (Judgment, 14 March 2001, available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ Seriec_75_esp.pdf) 
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